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updating the pressure and release model 
for global health emergencies
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Abstract 
Vulnerability has become a key concept in emergency response research and is being critically discussed across 
several disciplines. While the concept has been adopted into global health, its conceptualisation and especially its 
role in the conceptualisation of risk and therefore in risk assessments is still lacking. This paper uses the risk concept 
pioneered in hazard research that assumes that risk is a function of the interaction between hazard and vulnerability 
rather than the neo-liberal conceptualisation of vulnerability and vulnerable groups and communities. By seeking 
to modify the original pressure and release model, the paper unpacks the representation or lack of representation 
of vulnerability in risk assessments in global health emergency response and discusses what benefits can be gained 
from making the underlying assumptions about vulnerability, which are present whether vulnerability is sufficiently 
conceptualised and consciously included or not, explicit. The paper argues that discussions about risk in global health 
emergencies should be better grounded in a theoretical understanding of the concept of vulnerability and that this 
theoretical understanding needs to inform risk assessments which implicitly used the concept of vulnerability. By 
using the hazard research approach to vulnerability, it offers an alternative narrative with new perspectives on the 
value and limits of vulnerability as a concept and a tool.
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Introduction
While health and medicine use the term “risk” widely, its 
use usually lacks conceptualisation and is often defined 
merely in the sense of probability. This approach may 
suffice for traditional individual and population health 
issues. However, in the context of health emergencies and 
disaster health, it could benefit from a more thoroughly 
conceptualized addition.
Global health emergency response operates along simi-
lar lines as global disaster and humanitarian response and 
often in concert with actors from these fields. Learning 
from the conceptual discussions underlying disaster stud-
ies and hazard geography perspectives does not only lend 
a new lens to understand risk differently but this more 
comprehensive approach would also facilitate risk man-
agement and risk reduction in global health emergency 
response and thus lead to a more sustainable response. 
This paper provides a possible pathway for answering the 
question how can disaster studies and hazard geography 
help us develop a (social) vulnerability theory for global 
health emergencies.
Therefore, this paper seeks to bridge the gap between 
the disaster studies literature and the medical under-
standing of risk and suggests the adaptation of a clas-
sic model for understanding risk from the disaster 
studies, the Pressure and Release (PAR) model [1] for 
global health emergencies. The PAR model is arguably 
the best known and most accepted model for conceptual-
izing risk in the context of disaster and emergency and 
offers a comprehensive and compelling framework for 
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understanding the role of (social) vulnerability in risk. As 
such, this paper focuses mainly on the role of vulnerabil-
ity, currently an under-conceptualized component of risk 
in health emergencies.
Current uses of risk in health and medicine
Despite the mentioned lack of conceptualisation, risk 
is widely used in health and medicine and is a key ele-
ment in epidemiology. Examples for the use of risk in 
health and medicine include risk ratios [2, 3], attribut-
able risks [2, 3], diseases risks for individual patients and 
populations [2, 3], and comparisons of proportions of a 
population at risk [4]. In these contexts, “[r]isk has a very 
similar meaning in epidemiology as it does in everyday 
usage—it is about chance. It is defined by Unwin et al., as 
‘the probability that an event will occur’. It is often used 
to compare the risk of an event between groups” [5]. 
While this non-conceptual definition has merit, espe-
cially in traditional highly quantitative approaches to 
population health, it also comes with limitations. It omits 
the role of vulnerability as a key component of risk and 
as such, impedes risk reduction in less quantitative and 
data-rich situations. This paper does in no way argue 
that all understandings of risk (or vulnerability) in health 
and medicine should be replaced by a new understand-
ing, which is closer in line with that from disaster studies. 
Instead we argue that, in the case of global health emer-
gency response, an additional understanding of risk could 
be helpful both to better identify risks and vulnerabilities 
and respond to them as well as to facilitate cooperation 
with other actors in order to achieve comprehensive mit-
igation and risk reduction strategies.
Key concepts
While it goes beyond the scope of this article to give 
detailed definitions of all key concepts underlying both 
the original PAR model and the updated version, a short 
introduction to some of those concepts—namely hazard, 
vulnerability, risk and resilience—and their implication 
for the PAR model and its update is appropriate. The PAR 
model, in the tradition of disaster studies, rightly assumes 
risk to be more than just the possibility of an adverse 
event taking place and conceptualises risk as a function 
of hazard and vulnerability. This more complex concep-
tualisation also facilitates an understanding of resilience 
beyond that of a ‘bounce back (better)’ capacity.
Hazard
Understanding hazard is at the same time the starting 
point for understanding risk and the least controversial 
part of risk in the context of the PAR model and of con-
ceptualising risk. Hazard in this context is, in most cases, 
the natural component. Following the debates about the 
use and discontinuation of the use of ‘natural disaster’ 
[6–8], hazard can be understood as the only (potentially) 
natural component of disasters. Hazards exist in nature 
and society in all forms, including traditional natural haz-
ards such as geo-hazards (e.g. earthquakes or volcanic 
eruptions), hydro-hazards (e.g. tsunamis or floods), or—
in the context of this paper most important—biohazards 
(such as all disease-causing micro-organisms). A separate 
category in this context is technological hazards, which 
are not per se natural but driven by human action. The 
term and concept hazard does, however, make no com-
ment about the level of risk these hazards pose to humans 
(or animals, the environment, society, or the economy for 
that matter). In order to understand the potential risk 
associated with a hazard the dimension of vulnerability 
is necessary.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability lies at the heart of the conceptualisation of 
risk and of the traditional PAR model. Vulnerability is key 
component of risk and risk itself does not exist without 
vulnerability [9]. Vulnerability can be roughly defined 
as a function of exposure and susceptibility and can be 
applied to humans, environmental entities or societal or 
even technical structures.
Most—if not all—elements traditionally in the medi-
cal, health and epidemiology field termed ‘risk factors’ 
fall within the category of vulnerability and can be either 
on the exposure or on the susceptibility side. “Suscep-
tibility is a capacity characterizable by a set of intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors that modify the impacts of a specific 
exposure upon risks/severity of outcomes in an indi-
vidual or population” [10] while exposure characterises 
the likelihood of an encounter with the disease-causing 
organism and the level or strength of this encounter.
Vulnerability in this context plays a part in both like-
lihood and severity of disease and disease outbreaks for 
both individual patients and entire populations. The 
introduction of the concept of vulnerability is not meant 
to replace the concept of a risk factor but rather to offer 
a better understanding of why risk factors are risk factors 
and the underlying mechanisms of these risk factors, as 
well as to offer approaches to reduce the risk of diseases 
by reducing (human) vulnerability.
Risk
Risk is a complex concept made up of both hazard and 
vulnerability, even going beyond its components. Beck 
defines risk as “the modern approach to foresee and con-
trol the future consequences of human action, the various 
unintended consequences of radicalized modernization. 
Vulnerability = Exposure× Susceptibility
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It is an (institutionalized) attempt, a cognitive map, to 
colonize the future” [11]. While such a future oriented 
approach to risk is certainly beneficial in the context of 
resilience and of sustainable disaster and global health 
emergency response, the core of risk and the need for its 
conceptualisation in this context lies more within its abil-
ity to give different avenues to risk reduction by unpack-
ing the interaction between hazard and vulnerability to 
form risk. As such, Ewald’s conclusion that “[n]othing is a 
risk in itself; there is no risk in reality” [9] still holds true 
and forms the very basis of vulnerability and hazard and 
their distinction from risk.
Considering the traditional conceptualisation of risk as 
a function of both hazard and vulnerability, which also 
forms the basis of the traditional PAR model [1] risk is 
often defined as the following:
Combining this equation with the above introduced 
equation for vulnerability leads to a complex understand-
ing of risk:
This is not necessarily meant as a quantifiable equa-
tion but rather as a conceptual backdrop for understand-
ing risk and its components. However, one fundamental 
mathematical truth plays a crucial role in this equation. 
The idea that without hazard or without vulnerability 
there is no risk is central to both the understanding of 
risk and the use of the traditional PAR model as well as 
any adaptation for global health emergency response. The 
hazard side of the equation is less of a focus for the PAR 
model and thus possibilities for hazard reduction are not 
prioritized. However, within the PAR model, a significant 
reduction in vulnerability leads to a significant reduc-
tion in risk and a (however hypothetical) eradication of 
vulnerability leads to an eradication of risk. Being able 
to reduce risk by being able to target multiple different 
aspects of it gives additional options for risk reduction, 
mitigation and risk management.
Resilience
While definitions of resilience are highly contested [12] 
and the benefit and potential harm of the concept of 
resilience itself has been debated in the context of neo-
liberal society [13–15], all definitions of resilience carry 
with them at least some aspects of absorbing, changing 
and carrying on [16] as well as of recovery [17]. These 
ideas are often augmented by conceptualisations about 
resistance, absorption and restoration [6] and the ability 
to ‘bounce back’ [18] or even to emerge stronger. Schoon 
describes resilience as “a two-dimensional construct 
defined by the constellations of exposure to adversity and 
Risk = Hazard× Vulnerability
Risk = Hazard× Exposure× Susceptibility
the manifestation of successful adaptation in the face of 
that risk” [19]. As such, a complete conceptual under-
standing of risk, including its components is, if not nec-
essary, then at least highly beneficial to understanding 
and thus actively fostering resilience. Active disaster risk 
reduction enhances resilience. This holds true for global 
health emergencies as much as for other disasters. While 
reducing the hazard (the disease-causing organisms) is 
an admirable intention, it is also highly dependent on 
the specific type of bio-hazard. Focusing on the vulner-
ability side has the advantage of also offering perspectives 
for situations of unknown hazards. Thus, there is a need 
to increase focus on the vulnerability side of the risk—
including both susceptibility and exposure to the hazard. 
This approach holds the greatest promise of producing 
enduring resilience and therefore to a sustainable global 
health emergency response.
The original pressure and release (PAR) model
The original PAR model follows the understanding of 
risk as a function of hazard and vulnerability and focuses 
on the vulnerability side of risk and especially on factors 
related to susceptibility. While not clearly conceptualised, 
the original PAR model does include aspects of exposure 
but it does not directly associate these with susceptibil-
ity as a part of vulnerability. This could be seen as a cri-
tique of the original model. Due to the slight differences 
of global health emergencies to disasters associated with 
natural hazards, our adapted version explicitly includes 
aspects of heightened exposure in the progression of 
vulnerability.
Components of the original PAR model
The original or traditional PAR model defines three steps 
to explain the  progression of vulnerability: root causes, 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions [1]. Each step 
in the progression of vulnerability builds on the step(s) 
before and leads to increasing pressure on the whole sys-
tem. These steps, combined with the presence of hazard, 
lead to risk of disaster and ultimately to disaster [1]. Root 
causes in the original PAR model include limited access 
to power, limited access to structures, limited access to 
resources, aspects of the political system(s) and aspects 
of the economic system(s) [1]. Root causes as such, are 
at the structural level and often describe underlying situ-
ations and power dynamics that are ingrained in a soci-
ety or group. According to the original PAR model, these 
root causes can then lead to dynamic pressures, which 
include lack of training, lack of local investment, lack of 
press freedom, rapid population change, rapid urbanisa-
tion, and deforestation [1]. Root causes are mainly static 
and resistant to change within the span of an emergency 
response. Dynamic pressures are evolving systems that 
Page 4 of 8Hammer et al. Emerg Themes Epidemiol            (2019) 16:2 
can lead to increasing pressure and subsequently to 
unsafe conditions. Unsafe conditions include the physi-
cal environment, the local economy, social relations and 
public actions [1]. They are, in terms of traditional health 
and medical terminology, the most immediate risk fac-
tors. However, their causes lie in the preceding steps of 
the progression of vulnerability [1].
Critique of the original PAR model
As mentioned before, the role of exposure is not entirely 
clear in the original PAR model, however, it is sufficiently 
clear for the original uses. While the original model also 
lists ‘viruses and pests’ as potential hazards, the progres-
sion of vulnerability for those is slightly different. Most 
of the original factors and steps still hold true but they 
are insufficient to explain the progression of vulnerability 
towards disaster, which in this case can be defined as the 
outbreak of a disease, hence making an adaptation espe-
cially for global health emergencies sensible.
Other critiques of the original PAR model focus mainly 
on its lack of environmental focus, either expressed as 
a lack of focus on the role of sustainability [20] or as a 
lack of focus on human–environment interactions and 
the vulnerability of the biophysical world [21]. However, 
these issues have since been addressed in the second ver-
sion of the model. We acknowledge that the original PAR 
model—and the adapted version presented in this paper 
as well—certainly still has a decidedly human focus, spe-
cifically a focus on human vulnerability with an underly-
ing assumption that socio-economic vulnerability is key 
to risk. It is our aim to broaden the perspective on global 
health emergency response and a broader, adapted PAR 
model is one component of this.
The updated PAR model for health emergencies
While many of the assumptions made in the context of 
the original PAR model still hold true for a health specific 
update, they need to be critically examined and in some 
places augmented by root causes, dynamic pressures, 
and unsafe conditions that are more specific to health 
risk. The improved understanding of the progression of 
vulnerability in health emergencies has implications for 
vulnerability, risk and resilience and their conceptualisa-
tion—and lack thereof—in the concept of health emer-
gencies (Fig. 1).
Components
While the traditional root causes (limited access to 
power, structures and resources, and political and eco-
nomic systems) certainly hold true in the context of 
health emergencies the related issues of competition 
for power and resources [1], precarity [22, 23], poverty 
[22, 24, 25], and inequality [22, 24, 25] warrant further 
emphasis as root causes that facilitate the development of 
dynamic pressures. Competition for power and resources 
could be interpreted as a part of limited access to power, 
structures and resources. However, the level at which 
those root causes act and interact is different. Limited 
access to power, structures and resources arises from 
lack of an inclusive and democratic society and politi-
cal system. Competition for power and resources does 
not necessarily assume widespread access to power and 
resources. It focuses on those groups and individuals who 
have access and on how their interaction stabilises or 
destabilises any given situation. Additionally, we suggest 
considering environmental and ecological fragility. Envi-
ronmental and ecological fragility describes the resilience 
Fig. 1 Adapted PAR model for health emergencies
Page 5 of 8Hammer et al. Emerg Themes Epidemiol            (2019) 16:2 
or lack thereof of the natural environment and hence 
plays an important part in characterizing the geographi-
cal context. While it is not a component of social vulner-
ability, environmental fragility strongly impacts severity 
of exposure.
We see all of these root causes as based on conditions 
of structural violence comprised of historical patterns of 
underdevelopment, colonial histories, neo-colonialism, 
and neo-liberalism, which act as drivers of vulnerabil-
ity and form an integral part of the early progression of 
vulnerability [22]. These forms of structural violence and 
their ingrained stigmatization and marginalization of 
populations along lines of race, ethnicity, religion, gen-
der, sexuality, and socioeconomic status, lead to histor-
ically-rooted inequalities, which form the backdrop of 
many of the root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe 
conditions.
For dynamic pressure, the updated PAR model for 
health emergencies does not negate the importance of 
the originally stipulated dynamic pressures (lack of train-
ing, lack of local investment, lack of press freedom, rapid 
population change, rapid urbanisation and deforesta-
tion). However, if the risk that is being examined is that 
of a health crisis more suitable dynamic pressures can 
be found and substantiated by the evidence. We sug-
gest the following dynamic pressures: arms proliferation, 
armed conflict, displacement, violence, lack or break-
down of government services, lack of access to health 
care, and food insecurity. Arms proliferation is a direct 
precursor to armed conflict, which is arguably one of the 
main drivers for health emergencies that are secondary 
to a humanitarian crisis. Armed conflict and violence 
together foster a climate of insecurity which is conducive 
to disease outbreaks through a variety of mechanisms 
[26–35]. Population displacement leads to a lack of access 
to health services [27, 30, 36–38] and generally unsafe 
living conditions, both in camp and community settings 
[26, 27, 29–32, 34–47]. A lack or breakdown of govern-
ment services can lead to a breakdown of health related 
infrastructure including individual health services and 
population health services such as vaccination [26, 27, 
29, 30, 32–36, 38–45, 47–49] as well as a breakdown of 
other (critical) infrastructure and coordination [30, 32, 
34, 35, 37, 50]. All of the preceding can produce health 
emergencies. Food insecurity can be seen as a key pre-
cursor to malnutrition which is an important risk factor, 
both at the level of population and at the individual level, 
for communicable diseases [27, 30, 32, 36, 38–42, 49–51] 
and other health conditions [52–54].
In terms of unsafe conditions, we propose inclusion of 
the following, which are all highly conducive to ill health 
and direct or indirect progressions of the aforementioned 
dynamic pressures: overcrowding, insufficient vaccine 
coverage, high exposure to disease vectors, inadequate 
shelter, and poor water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). 
Overcrowding, which can result from both displace-
ment and entrapment, facilitates the spread of diseases 
from person to person and is thus a key risk factor for 
communicable disease outbreaks [27, 30, 32, 35–39, 42, 
49, 50, 55–67]. Insufficient vaccine coverage is produced 
both by a breakdown of government services, especially 
population health services, and by unvaccinated persons 
being displaced into areas with higher disease prevalence. 
Absence of vaccination has for example  been identified 
as an unsafe condition in the example of the European 
migration crisis [61, 62, 64, 68–70]. Similarly, increases in 
the presence of disease vectors, such as specific species of 
mosquitos the likelihood of an outbreak and of the trans-
mission of vector-borne diseases [29, 61] have significant 
consequences. Inadequate shelter without proper heat-
ing, ventilation and cooking facilities has implications 
both for communicable diseases [30, 32, 35, 39, 41, 56, 
60–62, 66, 71] and for non-communicable health such as 
asthma and COPD especially if indoor fires are used [30, 
32, 39]. Finally, the role of poor WASH as a risk factor 
and as such, as an adequate unsafe condition for commu-
nicable diseases, has been well documented [27, 29, 30, 
32, 35–39, 41, 49–51, 59, 60, 63, 66, 67, 72–75].
What we traditionally call a risk factor in health, medi-
cine and epidemiology is - according to the model and 
seen in a more complex picture—in fact a stage in the 
progression of vulnerability or in other words a compo-
nent of the overall vulnerability. Vulnerabilities are what 
might lead to disease in an individual and to an outbreak 
or epidemic in a population.
Implications for the understanding of vulnerability and risk 
in health emergencies
This model follows the original PAR model [1] in its 
understanding of (the progression of ) vulnerability. As 
such, vulnerability becomes a function of root causes, 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions:
Vulnerability and its progression stem from these 
multiplicatory components. The model highlights 
the interaction and progressive nature of the system. 
Those components traditionally identified as risk fac-
tors for health emergencies are most commonly found 
in the third category, unsafe conditions. While these are 
undoubtable the most direct risk factors, focusing only 
on them risks overlooking the complex causes of these 
unsafe conditions or risk factors.
Vulnerability = Root Causes × Dynamic Pressures
× Unsafe Conditions.
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The risk from the original equation in this context is 
the health emergency. That means, in many cases, an out-
break of a communicable disease, either as a stand-alone 
event such as the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak, or 
a larger humanitarian crisis, such as in ongoing  Chol-
era  epidemic in Yemen. When considering the original 
equation of risk being a function of hazard and vulner-
ability, the model and its components as described cover 
the vulnerability side, with the hazard being the disease-
causing micro-organism. Recall Ewald’s conclusion that 
risk only exists with vulnerability [9]. This means that, 
while it is improbable that all vulnerabilities in  situa-
tions such as the ones mentioned above can be reduced 
to zero, the risk can be greatly reduced by reducing the 
vulnerability towards said risk. This can be done with-
out always needing a ‘toolkit’ to reduce hazard. Hazard 
reduction is a suitable method in some circumstances but 
it is not the only or necessarily most productive approach 
in all situations.
Implications for the understanding of resilience in health 
emergencies
Understanding risk in terms of hazard and vulnerability 
fosters increased understanding of how to introduce and 
increase resilience by sustainably reducing vulnerability 
and therefore risk. Complex understandings of risk are a 
first step to work towards resilience, therefore our model 
may offer benefits. Our new concept of risk and vulner-
ability may highlight pathways to the ability to absorb, 
change, carry on [16], recover [17], resist, or absorb [12]. 
It is worthwhile to explore if the reconceptualisation can 
help lead to an increased capacity to ‘bounce back’ [18] or 
even bounce back better. However, more than just con-
ceptual insights are needed in order to foster lasting and 
positive resilience. In the context of global health emer-
gencies, the insights into vulnerability certainly highlight 
and reinforce that a focus on strengthening health sys-
tems can lead to a reduction of vulnerability and there-
fore a reduction of risk. Additionally, we believe that the 
dynamic element of the PAR model allows for the con-
sideration of changing conditions—and the causes of 
the changes, as traceable through the progression of vul-
nerability—to be considered in both epidemiology and 
risk assessment, which allows for both mitigation and 
preparedness.
Possible uses and advantages of the updated PAR model 
for health emergencies
Updating the original PAR model for health emergencies 
and using it in this context could lead to an improvement 
of the conceptual and practical understanding for the 
progression from population-level risk to outbreaks and 
epidemics. It could become easier to understand how a 
situation progresses to become an emergency. This pros-
pect has direct and indirect implications for risk assess-
ments, leading to potentially longer lead times between 
the detection of an increased risk due to increased vul-
nerability and an actual outbreak or epidemic.
Additionally, such a conceptual understanding can be 
used as a basis for improving targeted risk management 
and risk reduction interventions by providing action 
points for intervention and understanding where they lie 
in the progression of vulnerability. This opens the possi-
bility to prioritise interventions.
Combining these two approaches leads to a potential 
use of the adapted PAR model for estimating risk and 
vulnerability under alternative management approaches. 
These could include scenario planning or forecasting as 
well as post hoc analysis in order to better understand the 
value and reasoning for decisions made. This is particu-
larly relevant in contexts where situations are changing 
rapidly and creating considerable uncertainty. Thus, the 
adapted PAR model offers insights to facilitate adaptive 
management: adaptive strategies that develop in response 
to uncertain and changing circumstances.
Finally, harmonising the language of health emergency 
response with the language of disaster response can help 
foster a common understanding of concepts and facilitate 
better communication across sectors and clusters.
Limitations
Different thinking and practical implications of recon-
ceptualising vulnerability and risk in the context of health 
emergencies are difficult because risk is an ingrained 
concept in health and medicine. Moreover, the model 
does not offer automatic solutions or risk reduction 
measures. Instead, it seeks to contribute to a discussion 
on terminology and the implications of terminology for 
understanding, analysis, and action.
As it is currently built, the updated PAR model might 
be most suited to situations where general context and 
vulnerability progression are the focus rather than devel-
opment of the hazard. Hence, the model might be more 
immediately and obviously suitable to explain the devel-
opment of risk in cases of secondary health emergencies 
rather than emerging disease threats. It might be more 
suitable as an explanatory model for disease outbreaks 
in existing humanitarian crises such as the Cholera out-
break in Yemen rather than situations in which the dis-
ease outbreak constitutes the humanitarian crisis, such as 
the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic. We hope that use 
of our model will improve understanding of outcomes 
and add perspectives that acknowledge that underly-
ing social complexity. The progression of vulnerability 
remains a pivotal aspect in both types of events. With 
regard to emerging disease threats, the model would 
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explain only part of the problem and need to be aug-
mented by understanding other concurrent processes 
regarding the evolution and progression of the hazard.
Conclusion
Vulnerability is a key part in risk and this should be rec-
ognised in all fields that inherently deal with risk. While 
traditional definitions and terms such as ‘risk factor’ 
do not need to be replaced in the context of health and 
medicine, in global health emergency response, a more 
thorough consideration of their components certainly 
helps to understand mechanisms and pathways of risk 
beyond probability. This paper offers a theoretical model 
for renewed thinking about the meaning of risk and resil-
ience and at the same time seeks to reconcile the language 
of health and medicine with the language of disaster 
studies and disaster response. The analysis of risk factors, 
augmented with the conceptual understanding of their 
place in the progression of vulnerability, is an important 
part of understanding how global health emergencies 
evolve. The theoretical backing tentatively offered in this 
paper supports quantitative study of the epidemiological 
basis for risk factors in individual emergencies by pro-
viding a wider understanding of the role of risk factors. 
We also argue strongly for an interdisciplinary approach 
to global health emergency response. This approach can 
open new avenues for mutual understanding.
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